This article investigates the impact of postretirement employee benefits on the likelihood that workers expect to retire before age 62 and age 65. Using data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, probit regression models were estimated to explore the effect of pension plans and retiree health insurance on the expectation of early retirement. With respect to pension plans, the effects of both the type of pension plan and the expected benefits from those plans are explored. Similar effects were explored for retiree health benefits. The results indicate that postretirement pension benefits and the availability of retiree health benefits have a significant influence on workers' retirement age expectations.
1
Over the last three decades, the United States has experienced an extraordinary withdrawal of older men from the labor force. In 1965, 85% of men ages 55-64 were participating in the labor force, compared with 68% in 1985 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1988) . Since the mid-1980s, the labor force participation rate of men ages 55-64 has been relatively constant, fluctuating between 65% and 68%. The labor force participation rate of men ages 45-54 also declined during this time period, but close to 90% in this age group continued to participate in 1997 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1998) . In contrast, the labor force participation rate of women ages 45-54 and ages 55-64 continued to rise steadily through 1997.
Public policy interest in early retirement derives from concern about the ability of the economy to support larger numbers of retirees with the resources produced by a proportionately smaller number of workers. In 1950, there were 16.7 workers for every Social Security beneficiary (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1997) . Today there are roughly 4 workers per retiree and that number is expected to decline to roughly 2.5 by the year 2030. The paradox facing public policy makers is that increased life expectancy nas led to a U.S. policy that seeks to encourage a longer work life (e.g., the phased-in increase in the normal retirement age for Social Security benefits and the elimination of mandatory retirement), while early retirement is more common today than in the past. Public-and private-sector employee benefits may be playing a large role in the retirement process, a role that is working against increased work life. Public obligations to provide benefits to early retirees are limited because Social Security does not provide any retirement benefits before age 62 and Medicare is not available until age 65. Nevertheless, earlier retirement is an issue for public programs because it reduces the earnings base that supports Social Security and Medicare spending for older retirees.
Early economic research addressing the determinants of retirement interviewed retirees to examine why they retired when they did (Quinn, Burkhauser, & Myers, 1990) . Researchers gathered subjective responses and were forced to conclude that retirement incentives were not a factor because they were rarely mentioned. As a result, recent research has focused on objective measures of retirement behavior by focusing on how retirees behaved. Overall, most recent research shows that economic incentives to retire play an important role in retirement decisions.
Another way to explore whether economic incentives play a role in retirement is by examining the workers' intended retirement patterns. With the exception of Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) , Ekerdt, DeViney, and Kosloski (1996) , Hall and Johnson (1980) , Holtmann, Ullmann, Fronstin, and Longino (1994) , and Hurd and McGarry (1993) , there is little recent research focusing on workers' expected retirement patterns. Even the previously mentioned studies do not focus on the economic incentives of employee benefits.
Employers and policy makers are interested in reliable forecasts of future retirement patterns because they are important in formulating both employment policy and public policy. For example, will the upcoming increases in the eligibility age for full Social Security benefits have the expected effect of increasing the labor force participation of older workers? Ultimately, the retirement process may be better understood by examining workers' retirement expecSocial Security benefits, potential pension income, and retiree health benefits. This approach is in contrast to taking a "look back" at eventual behavior where researchers are inevitably forced to rely on the uncertain memories of retirees who may have retired 10-15 years prior to data collection. An examination of retirement outcomes leave the process of retirement and retirement decisions unobserved. In fact, previous research has shown that survey responses on retirement expectations are reliable predictors of future retirement, conditional on the information that was available at the time that individuals were planning their retirement process (Honig, 1994 (Honig, , 1996 Hurd & McGarry, 1994) .
This article examines early retirement decisions and how they relate to employee benefits. This article improves upon previous research in a number of ways. First, I take full advantage of data on postretirement employee benefits. Previous studies examining the role between early retirement and employee benefits have not fully utilized the data. For example, Ekerdt and colleagues (1996) used data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) but did not examine different types and combinations of pension plans, and did not include retiree health benefits in their analysis. Hurd and McGarry (1993) also used data from the HRS but used an outcome variable that measured the probability of working full-time past age 62, which does not fully account for complete withdrawal from the labor force. Hall and Johnson (1980) used data from the 1969 Retirement History Study, and Holtmann and colleagues (1994) used data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
The next section presents the rationale for the effects of economic incentives on early retirement decisions. The following section presents data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study concerning how employee benefits influence workers' expected retirement patterns. The last section discusses public policy implications.
Methods

Theoretical Considerations
The job-stopping process generally is initiated by the termination of career employment and frequently includes periods of postcareer employment, part-time work, partial retirement, and temporary retirement (Ruhm, 1991) . Previous research has established that retirement can be defined as a process, instead of a single event (Quinn & Kozy, 1996) . Workers often use one or more transitional stages, or bridge jobs, between their career job and complete withdrawal from the labor force. One common transitional stage is the movement from full-time work to part-time work. This usually occurs for wage and salary workers when they switch jobs, but it also may occur for workers in their current jobs.
The process of retirement varies with individual preferences, predicted future earnings, pension accruals, Social Security benefits, health, and preferences for leisure. A person's job-stopping process and subsequent choice of retirement age (defined here as his or her complete withdrawal from the labor force) may be made by weighing the combined benefits of the wages from continuing to work and the potential increase in future income from accruing greater pension benefits against the costs of forgoing the increased leisure of retirement and the cost of forgoing future pension accruals. To be realistic, the decision should account for risks, including uncertain future income, inflation, and premature death. Testing whether people account for these risks, however, would be mathematically difficult (Fields & Mitchell, 1984) .
Health insurance coverage also might help explain the retirement process. Employer-sponsored health insurance for individuals not participating in the labor force can be a significant source of income security for early retirees, because Medicare, the federal health insurance for retirees, is not available to people younger than age 65 unless they are disabled. Although early retirees as a group are probably healthier than those ages 65 and older, the risk of medical need increases with age. Early retirees without health insurance may be vulnerable to costly medical expenses. Individually purchased health insurance policies can be expensive, may restrict coverage for certain services, and may be unavailable for persons with preexisting conditions who lack prior creditable health insurance coverage. Group health insurance through an employer is usually the most affordable source of health insurance coverage for early retirees and may be an important variable in the retirement decision.
Retiree Health Insurance.-An Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) public opinion poll indicates that there is a direct link between a worker's decision to retire early and the availability of retiree health insurance (EBRI, 1998) . In 1998, 74% of workers reported that they would not retire before becoming eligible for Medicare if their employer did not provide retiree health benefits. Yet the same survey shows that 45% plan to retire before age 65. The survey also found tnat 82% of the respondents believed they would need additional health insurance coverage beyond what is provided by the Medicare program, and 47% expected their former employer to provide retiree health insurance.
The rationale for why availability of retiree health insurance should affect the retirement process is straightforward, as noted by Madrian (1994) . There is a direct link between labor force participation and health insurance coverage. Almost 75% of wage and salary workers ages 18-64, have employment-based health insurance coverage (Fronstin, 1996) . This insurance is portable into retirement only in the sense that some workers have the option of continuing their coverage under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), which requires employers with 20 or more workers to offer continued access to group health insurance coverage to qualified beneficiaries for up to 18 months. Otherwise, without the availability of retiree health insurance, retirees may not have access to health insurance coverage until age 65, though some may have access to insurance through a spouse. Although some workers have access to retiree health insurance, most do not have it or even know if they would have coverage if they retired. For example, previous research found that 34% of workers aged 45 or older worked for an employer that sponsored retiree health insurance either throughout tneir retirement (29%) or only until age 65 (5%) (Yakoboski et al., 1994) . Although 15% reported that retiree health insurance was unavailable, 21% did not respond to the question or did not know the answer, and 30% did not have access to health insurance through their employer. If one assumes that the 21% who did not know the answer or did not respond to the question do not have access to retiree health insurance, then 66% of workers aged 45 or older do not have access to retiree health insurance.
Workers considering leaving the labor force early could obtain health insurance prior to becoming eligible for Medicare either through a spouse or the private market for insurance. However, purchasing health insurance in the private market may not be affordable. Employers that provide access to group health insurance often are able to obtain lower premiums than individuals can because insurance companies spread risk across a larger group of people, and the average administrative costs are lower. In addition, the need for health insurance increases with age (Madrian, 1994) . Older individuals are relatively more likely to be in fair or poor health, they are more likely to report having been diagnosed with a serious health condition, and they spend a greater proportion of their family income on medical expenses. As a result, lack of health insurance during retirement could be an impediment to leaving the labor force prior to age 65.
Employment-Based Pension
Plans.-Employmentbased pension plans can facilitate or encourage workers' withdrawal from the labor force, including some workers who may not yet be eligible for Social Security benefits. From a conceptual perspective, employer pensions may be thought of as falling into one of two categories: defined contribution and defined benefit plans. Defined contribution plans create different economic incentives than defined benefit plans. From the perspective of the employee, the defined contribution plan is essentially a savings vehicle and provides no incentive to leave the labor force at any particular age. The defined contribution account allows a worker to accumulate assets that may be sufficient to support labor force withdrawal at an early age, but the worker need not attain any particular age to use those assets in retirement.
Although defined contribution plans have no intrinsic retirement age, the differing tax treatment of benefits from defined contribution plans at different ages may influence the retirement process. Defined contribution plans commonly distribute assets to their participants in the form of lump-sum distributions. Before age 59 1 /2 the recipient may be subject to a 10% penalty tax on the lump sum (in addition to regular income tax). Therefore, participants planning to take such distribution may have an incentive to delay the distribution of assets until age 59V2. On the other hand, the defined contribution plan participant can avoid the penalty by rolling the distribution into a qualified annuity rather than receiving it as a lump sum. Moreover, the penalty tax may be circumvented by taking distributions that are part of a series of substantially equal periodic payments made for the life (or life expectancy) of the employee or the joint lives (or joint life expectancies) of the employee and his or her beneficiary.
In a defined contribution plan, the employer may make a specified periodic contribution to the employee's pension account. Some plans accept or may even require employees' contributions as a condition of participation in the plan. Investment gains or losses in the plan are credited to the employee's account; the employer bears no investment risk. Once vested, the value of employees' pension assets is not contingent on how long they remain with the firm. As long as employees actively participate in the plan, they can continue to accumulate assets.
Defined benefit plans typically promise a specified benefit on retirement from a job, usually based on the employee's earnings and length of service, for the life of the employee or surviving spouse. Because increases in the employee's salary with continued work can raise the amount of pension benefits attributable to past service, the value of pension benefits accrued each year increases as the worker approaches the earliest age for reduced retirement benefits, a phenomenon known as "backloading," though a careeraverage plan instead of a final-salary plan substantially reduces this effect (Clark & McDermed, 1988) . However, in most pension plans there is a typical age where pension wealth is at a maximum and continued work, especially into late ages, triggers a reduction in the present value of pension wealth from continuing to work (Jppolito, 1997) .
Typically, employer plans calculate early retirement benefits as a percentage of the accrued pension benefit that would have been paid at the normal retirement date. The pension benefit is actuarially reduced to reflect the participant's longer benefit payout period and lost investment earnings on plan assets. During the interval between the plan's early retirement age and the normal retirement age, employers often adjust the pension benefit in a more or less economically fair way (Ippolito, 1997) . A fair actuarial reduction gives full recognition to the longer payout period and lost investment earnings (Allen, Melone, Rosenbloom & VanDerhei, 1992) . However, once the worker reaches the normal retirement age, which may or may not be before age 65, the worker is penalized for each additional year of work.
During limited "window periods," employers may offer enhanced retirement benefits to encourage early retirement to reduce the size of their work force. Casn bonuses, additional age and service credits, and continued insurance benefits may be offered to employees who retire early. benefit received at retirement depends on age and earnings received in the highest-paid years of work. Currently, at age 62, covered workers can elect to receive 80% of the full retirement benefit available at age 65. For each month after age 62 that a worker postpones benefits, the reduction of 20% decreases 0.56% (or 8.3% of the age 62 benefit per year). In addition, the credit for delayed retirement will increase for each year the initial benefit is postponed up to age 70. Tnis structure results in an incentive to leave the labor force at ages 62 and 65, and offers little incentive to leave the labor force between ages 62 and 65, but then it creates a big disincentive to work after age 65 for the average worker (Ippolito, 1997) . Although it should be noted that very few workers are average, and life expectancy and rates of time preference will either create an incentive or disincentive to continue working past ages 62 and 65, a recent study, which includes a review of the literature, suggests that subjective survival probabilities show considerable promise for estimating models of decision making under uncertainty (Hurd & McGarry, 1995) . This would imply that the average worker will apply a given set of rules to his or her own personal circumstances. Specifically, this implies that retirement expectations are reliable predictors of future retirement, conditional on the information that was available at the time that individuals were planning their retirement process.
Another disincentive to continue working is the "earnings test." Social Security benefits of beneficiaries ages 65-69 are reduced by one dollar for every three dollars of earnings that exceeds an annual limit ($14,500 in 1998). Retirees with substantial pension incomes, Social Security benefits, and savings may not have incentives to work anyway, and analysts believe that the earnings test by itself has a limited effect on work effort. However, a relatively small group of retirees (about 2% of retirees ages 65-69) appear to limit their work effort to avoid losing Social Security benefits. These people are most likely to increase their hours of work as a result of a change in the earnings test (Leonesio, 1990) .
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 will increase the normal retirement age incrementally from 65 to 67 by the year 2027, reduce the early retirement benefits payable at age 62 from 80% of the full retirement benefit to 70%, and increase the credit for delayed retirement by one-half of one percentage point every other year, or from 3% to 8% per year after the /ear 2007. Although these changes make the Social Security benefit formula actuarially more fair, analysts have estimated that they are of insufficient magnitude to have a major effect on retirement decisions (Fields & Mitchell, 1987) .
Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) allows researchers to examine the role of the economic incentives of employee benefits on retirement patterns. The HRS, originally conducted in 1992, is a national ongitudinal study focusing on individuals born between the years 1931 and 1941. As a result, the ageeligible population was between the ages of 51 and 61 at the beginning of the study. A total sample of more than 9,000 age-eligible respondents were interviewed in 1992 and they will be followed and reinterviewed in future years to study their retirement patterns. In addition, the survey collected data on demographics, physical health, housing and mobility, family structure, current and past employment, retirement plans, income, and insurance.
Because the focus of this article is on retirement expectations, the sample is limited to non-self-employed workers. Individuals have also been excluded if they were working part-time-defined as less than 35 hours per week as they may have already started the retirement process by cutting back on work hours. Some individuals in the sample analyzed in this article will be affected by the Social Security normal retirement age increase. Because Fields and Mitchell (1987) expect the change to not have a major effect on the retirement process, the changing eligibility age is not controlled for in this study. In fact, the age 62 predictions presented in the next section are not affected by the increase in the eligibility age. Although the spouses of the age-eligible individuals were also interviewed in the survey, I did not include them in the analysis in this article, even if the spouse was not born between 1931 and 1941. However, some of their data are matched to the age-eligible individual.
After excluding nonworkers and the self-employed I am left with a sample of 5,040. Excluding part-time workers reduces the sample size to 4,322. In order to gather information on health insurange coverage for secondary respondents in the sample, family members had to be matched. After excluding observations for missing data on retirement expectations, missing matches, and other missing data, the final sample is 4,268: 2,420 men and 1,848 women. Sample statistics are shown for men and women in Table 1 , and the means for more detailed postretirement benefit data are shown in Table 2 for men.
Measures
Workers were asked a series of questions about their anticipated retirement patterns, such as whether they planned to stop working altogether, never stop working, continue as they were, work fewer hours, or change the kind of work they do, and workers who planned to stop working were asked a follow-up question to determine the planned age of retirement. Workers were allowed to choose all of the options that applied. However, in this analysis, workers were not allowed to report more than one option. For example, if a worker reported that he or she planned to stop working, then that answer took precedent over all other options. The distribution of the reported answers did not change significantly after restricting the choice of options. According to Table 3, 6.3% of men and 6.7% of women reported that they planned to stop working before age 62. An additional 11.5% of men and 12.5% of women planned to stop working between ages 62 and 64. In contrast, women were much more likely than men to report that they had not given much tnought to retirement (33.9% for men and 38.9% for women).
Workers with a pension plan were more likely to report that they expected to stop working before age 62 and before age 65 than workers without a retirement plan. This is true for both men and women. In addition, for workers with a retirement plan, those with a defined benefit plan-whether or not they had a supplemental defined contribution plan-were more likely to expect to stop working before age 65 than workers witn only a defined contribution plan. Finally, workers who expected to receive retiree health benefits were more likely to expect to stop working before age 65 than workers not expecting retiree health benefits.
Results
In order to understand the relationship between expected retirement patterns and employee benefits, a series of probit models are estimated. Two dependent variables are measured: the probability of expecting to stop working (hereafter referred to as retire) before age 62 and the probability of expecting to retire before age 65. These ages were chosen to correspond to the eligibility age for early and full Social Security benefits. Separate estimates are presented in Table 4 for. men and women. In the first two columns of Table 4 , the probit results on the probability of expecting to retire before age 62 are presented for men and women. Columns 3 and 4 contain the probit results on the probability of expecting to retire before age 65.
In general, postretirement employee benefits signi- ficantly affect the probability of retiring early for men, but not for women. Men with a primary defined benefit plan combined with a supplemental defined contribution plan were more likely than men without any pension plan to expect to retire before age 62. They were also more likely to expect to retire before age 65. Men with a defined benefit plan with no defined contribution plan were also more likely than men without any pension plan to expect to retire before age 62 and age 65. Although the effect of a stand-alone defined contribution was to increase the probability of expecting to retire before age 62 for men, this effect was less significant than the defined benefit effects. It was not significant in the age 65 equation. With the exception of a small statistically significant effect for stand-alone defined benefit plans in the age 65 equation, none of the pension plan effects were significant for women.
The availability of retiree health benefits appears to affect the expectation that male workers will retire before ages 62 and 65. The effect is significant at the 5% level in the age 62 equation and at the 1% level in the age 65 equation. This may suggest that as a man gets closer to eligibility for Medicare he is more likely to be influenced to retire before being eligible for Medicare the shorter the waiting period for Medicare. The effect of retiree health insurance was insignificant for women in both equations.
Although this study is not estimating a full simultaneous model of joint decision making for married individuals, it is important to control for spousal characteristics because the availability of a pension or retiree health insurance may have an influence on a spouse's retirement process. I found that the effect of spousal characteristics does not matter for men but it has a limited effect for women. Specifically, a married man whose spouse has a defined benefit plan with a supplemental defined contribution plan is not more likely to expect to retire early when compared with a married man whose spouse does not have a pension plan. In contrast, a married woman whose spouse has a defined benefit plan with a supplemental defined contribution plan is significantly more likely to expect to retire before age 62, but not age 65.
Overall, few other explanatory variables significantly affected the probability of expecting to retire early with a few exceptions. Turning to the influence of marital status on the propensity to expect to retire early, the results reflect the asymmetric influence of marital disruption on women compared to men. The probability that women will plan to retire before age 65 is significantly reduced after a divorce. The probability of expecting to retire before age 62 is also significantly lower for widowed women. In contrast, marital status has absolutely no significant effect on the probability of retiring early for men. The fact that married women have a higher probability of expecting to retire early than divorced or widowed women may be partly attributable to the fact that married women may be less likely to continue, working if their spouses retires early (though the argument could also be made that women would prefer to stay in the labor force after a spouse retires).
Expected Benefits
Although the type of pension plan may have a significant impact on a worker's retirement expectation, the expected benefit from the pension plan may have an even more important effect on the labor force participation decision. In Table 5 , estimates are presented for a probit model that uses a set of dummy variables to account for the expected benefit in retirement. The actual reported expected benefit for workers with a primary defined benefit plan is used instead of a single dummy variable. In the HRS, expected benefits for defined benefit plans were reported a number a ways. Workers were allowed to report the amount that they expected to receive either as a percentage of pay or as a dollar amount per year. Workers were also allowed to report whether they expected to receive a lump-sum distribution. Some workers reported that they did not know what income to expect in retirement from their defined benefit plan. For workers with a defined contribution plan, the amount accumulated in the account was used in the model.
The first column in Table 5 contains the parameter estimates from a probit model on the probability that a male worker plans to retire before age 62. The second set of probit estimates contains the probability Note. These regressions also included the same independent variables presented in Table 4 . There was little change in the coefficient magnitudes and significance levels. ***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
that a male worker plans to retire before age 65. Results from women are not presented because the sample size of the expected benefit variables were too small to yield reliable estimates.
Overall the results using expected benefits were mixed. Men with defined benefit plans were more likely to plan to retire before age 62 than men without a defined benefit plan when they expected to receive either 60-79% of their pay in retirement and when they expected to receive between $10,000 and $50,000 annually. Workers with more than $50,000 in their defined contribution accounts were more likely than other workers to expect to retire before age 62. In the age 65 equation, the results are similar with the exception that even workers expecting a relatively small annual annuity expect to retire before age 65. This result suggests that the closer an individual is to receiving Social Security and Medicare, the more willing he would be to retire early given a smaller level of postretirement benefits. Workers with a relatively high level of expected benefits from a defined benefit plan were not more likely to retire before either age 62 or 65 than either workers with less generous benefits or workers with no defined benefit plan. As mentioned above, defined benefit pension plans typically base benefits on some combination of years of service and final pay. If one assumes that these workers are at the high end of the income distribution, then one would expect them to continue working longer in life because of the opportunity cost associated with leaving the labor force.
I also found that workers who expect their former employers to pay for all or some of their retiree health benefits were more likely to expect to retire before age 62 than workers whose employers offer the benefit but are not expected to subsidize it. Table 6 contains the predicted probability of expecting to retire early based on the probit equation estimates presented in Table 4 . The predictions are calculated at the variable means. I found that the probability of expecting to retire before age 62 for men is 1.1% if there is no pension plan, 6.4% if the person has a defined benefit plan with a supplemental defined contribution plan, and 6.5% if the person has a defined benefit plan without a supplemental defined contribution plan. Individuals with a defined benefit plan are also roughly 43% more likely to expect to retire before Vol.39, No. 1, 1999 age 62 than individuals with a stand-alone defined contribution plan. This effect falls to between 18% and 25% for those expecting to retire before age 65, again suggesting that the shorter the time to full Social Security and Medicare benefits, the less of an effect these differences have on expectations. Men who do not expect retiree health insurance have a 2.9% chance of expecting to retire before age 62 compared to 4.6% of men who do not expect retiree health insurance. In other words the probability of expecting to retire before age 62 increases by 59% if retiree health insurance is available. The difference in the probability of expecting to retire before age 65 falls to 28% for those expecting and not expecting retiree health insurance.
Predictions
Although the predictions for women are presented in Table 6 , they are less meaningful, as there are fewer significant effects in Table 4 . For example, the probability of a woman expecting to retire before age 65 decreases with the availability of retiree health insurance because the coefficient in Table 4 is negative (but statistically insignificant).
Discussion
Americans are living longer, healthier lives. However, because Americans, especially men, are permanently withdrawing from the labor force at earlier ages than in the past, financing of the Social Security and Medicare programs is becoming an increasing challenge. The Medicare trust fund already is in negative cash flow and is expected to be depleted by 2010. The Social Security trust fund is projected to enter a state of negative cash flow in 2020, with depletion of the trust fund following in 2032, according to the projections presented in the 1998 trustees report (Board of Trustees, 1998) . Although the size of the federal budget as a percentage of gross domestic product has not changed significantly in recent years, entitlements such as the Social Security and Medicare programs are accounting for an increasing proportion of the federal budget (Quinn, 1996) . Given the changing demographics of the United States, these projected trends are not sustainable. The baby boom generation will start to withdraw from the labor force in 2011, just after the projected depletion date of the Medicare trust fund. Hence, the projected trends are not even sustainable in the short run.
Even though the normal retirement age for Social Security benefits is 65, and most individuals do not qualify for Medicare benefits before age 65, many Americans continue to withdraw from the labor force prior to age 65. Some analysts have concluded that employee benefits play a large role in the labor force withdrawal of older Americans. Increased retirement income from public and private sources appears to have been the main cause of the trend toward early retirement. Benefit provisions allowing early retirement may reflect employer and employee preferences for relatively short work lives rather than more frequent periods of leisure during a lengthier work life. However, future declines in the number of new entrants into the labor force may increase the demand for labor and lead employers to increase incentives for older workers to stay on the job longer.
Changes to laws and regulations affecting early retirement have been proposed as a way to encourage older workers to stay employed longer. However, reducing employer flexibility in structuring compensation may interfere with the ability of employers and employees to negotiate a compensation package that reflects changing needs over the course of a work life. Policy makers might want to enhance the ability to choose freely between retirement and work. Attempts to encourage a longer working life might be framed as an effort to encourage flexibility in retirement to supplement resources and account for unanticipated changes in resource needs.
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